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Abstract: In June 2007 the Supreme Court of Canada held that the right to 
collective bargaining is a constitutionally protected under the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms’ guarantee of freedom of association.  In so doing, 
they overruled a twenty-year old line of precedent that had rejected that 
very proposition.  The court rested its current position of four grounds, one 
of which was that Canadian labour history supports the view that 
collective bargaining had become recognized as a fundamental right prior 
to the Charter.  This article critically reviews the court’s labour history and 
argues that it erroneously asserts that workers enjoyed a right to bargain 
that entailed a correlative duty on employers to negotiate in good faith 
prior to the passage of modern collective bargaining legislation during and 
in the aftermath of World War II.  As well, it criticizes the court’s method 
of selectively extracting passages from the work of labour historians while 
ignoring the critical insights their work provides.  This enables the court to 
construct a highly romanticized and unrealistic story of the steady progress 
of labour law from repression to toleration to recognition, and to ignore 
weaknesses of the current regime of industrial legality, a thin version of 
which its decision protects.  Finally, the paper considers the conditions for 
and implications of the court’s ironic emergence as the defender of 
workers’ collective rights against encroachments by the state at the turn of 
the twenty-first century. 
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Forthcoming in Labour/Le Travail 61 (Spring 2008) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Readers of this journal are probably aware that in a judgment issued in 
June, 2007, Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector 
Bargaining Association v. British Columbia1, the Supreme Court of 
Canada (SCC) held that the right to bargain collectively is constitutionally 
protected under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ guarantee of 
freedom of association.  Less well known is that the court cited the work 
of this journal’s current editor, Bryan Palmer, and a number of past 
contributors,2 as well as that of other progressive academics and activists.3  
Not only is it unusual for labour history to make an appearance in SCC 
judgments, but the court’s reliance on the work of the critical labour 
historians is, to my knowledge, unprecedented.4   
                                                 
* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I would like to thank David 
Camfield, Alvin Finkel, Harry Glasbeek, Judy Fudge, Gregory Kealey, Brian Langille, 
Bryan Palmer, Sara Slinn, and members of the Toronto Labour Studies Group for their 
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. 
1Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Association v. British 
Columbia, <http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2007/2007scc27/2007scc27.html> (18 
December 2007). 
2 These include Judy Fudge, Jacques Rouillard and Jeremy Webber. 
3 These include John Calvert, Harry Glasbeek, Dan Glenday, and Karl Klare. 
4  In Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney-General), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016, the court cited the 
expert witness affidavit of Professor Judy Fudge for the proposition that farm workers 
have been unable to establish collective bargaining without the support of a facilitative 
statutory collective bargaining scheme.  It should be noted that no labour historians were 
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Arguably, this event should be cause for celebration.  First, the work was 
put to a good cause.  The court invoked Canadian labour history for the 
purpose of reversing a twenty-year-old line of precedent holding that 
Charter-protected freedom of association does not extend to collective 
bargaining.5 Second, the court’s extensive referencing of the work of 
critical labour historians gives it the legal equivalent of the Good 
Housekeeping seal of approval.  At least for lawyers and law students, 
their interpretive claims have been officially validated. 
 
But before we break open the champagne (okay, union-made Canadian 
beer), a more careful reading of the case shows the judgment to be replete 
with ironies, both in its use of historical writing and in its result.  
Moreover, there is much less here to celebrate than readers might have 
thought.  Indeed, as I will argue, the truth the judgment validates is the 
historiography of the industrial pluralists, who see the development of 
labour law as a natural process of interest adjustment in the name of 
achieving the common good, rather than that of their critics, who see 
labour law developing out of class conflict in ways that reproduce and 
only somewhat ameliorate unequal power relations. While the court’s 
cavalier use of sources may offend academic sensibilities, the more 
important problem with the judgment arises from the consequences of its 
failure to acknowledge, let alone appreciate, the critique of industrial 
pluralism made in the work that it relied upon.  This contributes to a 
judgment that both exalts and constitutionalizes a deeply flawed regime of 
industrial legality at a time when its limits have become increasingly 
apparent.  Thus, while the judgment provides public sector workers with 
some welcome relief from assaults on their collective bargaining rights, it 
also endorses a set of ideological and institutional commitments that serve 
workers poorly.  Before delving more deeply into these ironies, however, 
it will be helpful briefly to first locate the case in its historical context and 
summarize the judgment. 
                                                                                                                         
involved with the case as expert witnesses and, to my knowledge, none were retained to 
assist litigants with the preparation of their briefs.  
5 The earlier cases were collectively referred to as the Labour Trilogy.  See Reference re 
Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 ("Alberta 
Reference"), PSAC v. Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424, and RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, 
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 460. 





II. CONTESTING THE NEOLIBERAL ASSAULT 
 
The post-World War II regime of embedded liberalism, characterized by 
state policies designed to promote employment, economic growth and the 
welfare of its citizens, and which included a commitment to union-based 
industrial relations and collective bargaining, began to unravel in the 
1970s in the face of a crisis of accumulation.  Employers in Canada and in 
other industrial capitalist countries responded by pursuing workplace and 
political strategies that enabled them to capture a larger share of the value 
of social production.  In part, this has been accomplished directly by the 
adoption of labour management policies that include increased resistance 
to and, where possible, avoidance of collective bargaining, shifting from 
more to less secure employment forms by using more part-time, temporary 
and so-called self-employed workers, and demanding more from, while 
paying less to, its current workforce.6  At the same time, they have also 
adopted more decentralized organizational forms of production that 
enhanced employee insecurity and reduced regulatory protection.7   
Finally, capital has sought to shift the direction of state policy from the 
weak Keynesian welfare regime that prevailed in Canada after World War 
II to a neo-liberal one that pursues the imperatives of global competition, 
including the negotiation of free trade agreements that restrict the capacity 
of elected governments to regulate capital, amendments to labour and 
employment laws that facilitate employer flexibilization strategies at the 
expense of working conditions and employment security, reductions in 
social spending that provide tax cuts for the wealthy and increase workers’ 
labour market dependence, and direct attacks on public sector workers’ 
collective bargaining rights and working conditions.8   
                                                 
6 For an overview, see Leah H. Vosko, ed., Precarious Employment (Montreal 2006). 
7 For a recent discussion of this phenomenon and its implications for labour market 
regulation, see Judy Fudge, “Fragmenting Work and Fragmenting Organizations: The 
Contract of Employment and the Scope of Labour Regulation,” Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 44 (2006), 609-48. 
8 The literature is vast.  A small selection includes, David Harvey, A Brief History of 
Neoliberalism (New York, 2005); Robert Johnson and Rianne Mahon, “NAFTA, the 
Redesign, and Rescaling of Canada’s Welfare State,” Studies in Political Economy 76 
(Autumn 2005), 7-30; Eric Tucker, “’Great Expectations’ Defeated?: The Trajectory of 
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The achievement of these objectives requires capital to overcome barriers 
erected by past struggles and sustained by continuing popular support.  
Nowhere has this been more evident than in the area of public health care, 
which continues to enjoy immense popular support notwithstanding 
ongoing attacks by conservative ideologues and corporate interests that 
stand to gain by its privatization.  While frontal assaults on public health 
care have not been successful, governments have pursued a variety of 
policies that provide private enterprise with entry points into the system, 
such as through public-private partnerships (P3s) and contracting out of 
support services to the private sector.  As well, governments have also 
emulated private sector employment policies, whether for the purposes of 
facilitating privatization or to control health care costs, usually at the 
expense of the least well-paid workers in the system who are 
disproportionately women and new immigrants.9 
 
This brings us to British Columbia under the Liberal regime of Gordon 
Campbell.  Elected in 2001 with an overwhelming majority of seats, the 
government moved to restructure the health care system through a variety 
of measures, including a reduction of service and the launch of P3 
projects.  As well, in the middle of the night on 28 January 2002, with 
almost no notice to the affected unions and with little debate, the 
government enacted Bill 29.  The law allowed for extensive privatization, 
transfers of service, and hospital closures without public consultation.  As 
well, it also stripped the existing collective agreement covering support 
workers of important protections in relation to contracting out, successor 
rights, bumping, and job retraining and placement and prohibited future 
                                                                                                                         
Collective Bargaining Regimes in Canada and the United States Post-NAFTA,” 
Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 26 (Fall 2004), 97-150. 
9 Pat Armstrong and Hugh Armstrong, Wasting Away, 2nd ed. (Toronto 2003); Pat 
Armstrong and Kate Laxer, “Precarious Work, Privatization, and the Health Care 
Industry: the Case of Ancillary Workers,” in Vosko, ed., Precarious Employment, 115-
38; Alina Gildner, “Measuring Shrinkage in the Welfare State: Forms of Privatization in 
a Canadian Health Care Sector,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 39 (March 2006), 
53-75.  




collective bargaining over these issues.10   These changes had an enormous 
impact on the largely female and heavily immigrant and older workforce.11   
One reason the government may have been particularly keen to push 
through a privatization agenda was that the Hospital Employees’ Union 
(HEU) had successfully fought a long battle to achieve pay equity for its 
largely female membership.  Between 1991 and 2001 gendered wage 
differences had been significantly reduced and more pay equity 
adjustments were scheduled for 2002 and 2003.  Since there is no pay 
equity legislation in British Columbia, the effect of privatization would not 
only be to relieve the government of having to pay higher wages to health 
care workers in female dominated jobs, but also the private firms that were 
contracted to provide services could revert to paying discriminatory wages 
with little risk that their practices would be challenged.12   
 
The HEU, which represented a majority of the affected workers, and the 
British Columbia Federation of Labour develop a two-pronged response.  
The first prong included public demonstrations against the cutbacks, 
mobilization of the HEU membership for a possible strike and, organizing 
towards a general strike in support of HEU, although the latter was largely 
the activity of grassroots activists rather than union leaders.  The second 
prong was a legal one, including both a complaint to the International 
Labor Organization that the government’s actions violated Convention 87 
respecting freedom of association and the launch of a Charter challenge to 
Bill 29, on the grounds that it violated the affected workers’ section 2(d) 
right to freedom of association and their section 15 right to equality.  The 
outcome of the first prong of the strategy is well known.  The government 
did not back down. When the next round of collective bargaining failed to 
produce an agreement, and the support workers struck on 25 April 2004, 
the government quickly enacted Bill 37, a draconian back to work law that 
imposed a retroactive wage cut, increased the workweek without an 
increase in pay, and further weakened seniority rights.  HEU workers 
                                                 
10 Health and Social Services Delivery Improvement Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 2.   
11 Jane Stinson, Nancy Pollak and Marcy Cohen, The Pains of Privatization (BC 2005). 
12 Marjorie Griffin Cohen, “Destroying Pay Equity: The Effects of Privatizing Health 
Care in British Columbia,” (Vancouver  March 2003) 
http://www.heu.org/~DOCUMENTS/Miscellaneous/Research/pay_equity_final_2.pdf 
(18 December 2007). 
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defied the legislation and were joined on the picket lines by other 
unionized workers.  As momentum toward a widening sympathy strike 
was building, top labour officials and government officials quietly 
negotiated a memorandum that slightly modified the terms of the back-to-
work legislation, and the strike was called off.  The memorandum was not 
put to a vote among the affected workers.13 
 
While the first prong of the strategy was for the most part being played out 
very publicly on the streets, the legal strategy was quietly winding its way 
through the ILO offices and the courts.  The ILO complaint was filed on 1 
March 2002 and was upheld by the Committee on Freedom of Association 
in March 2003.  The BC government ignored the ruling without suffering 
any political consequences, just as Canadian governments have previously 
done when the ILO has found them to be in violation of their international 
obligations.14  The constitutional challenge was first argued in August 
2003, shortly after HEU members rejected a tentative contract to settle the 
first collective agreement after Bill 29.  Not surprisingly, Garson J. 
dismissed the union’s claims, based on earlier SCC decisions holding that 
freedom of association did not protect collective bargaining.  Garson J. 
also rejected the equality rights claim on the ground that the separate and 
unequal treatment of health care workers was based on their sector of 
employment and not on any personal characteristics.15  The case was 
appealed and, coincidentally, argument began on 3 May 2004, a day on 
which escalating strike activity in response to Bill 37 was expected, but 
which was avoided by the deal reached between the government and top 
                                                 
13 David Camfield, “Neoliberalism and Working-Class Resistance in British Columbia: 
The Hospital Employees’ Union Struggle, 2002-2004,” Labour/Le Travail, 57 (Spring 
2006), 9-41; Health Sector (Facilities Subsector) Collective Agreement Act, S.B.C. 2004, 
c. 19.  This pattern of derailing broadening strike movements is not unusual.  For a 
detailed account of the 1983 solidarity movement in British Columbia, see Bryan D. 
Palmer, Solidarity: The Rise and Fall of an Opposition in British Columbia (Vancouver 
1987). 
14 330th Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association, (Geneva, March 2003), 
Case 2180, paras. 301-02. On Canada’s dismal record before the ILO, see Ken Norman, 
“ILO Freedom of Association Principles as Basic Canadian Human Rights: Promises to 
Keep,” Saskatchewan Law Review 67:2 (2004), 591-608. 
15 (2003), 19 B.C.L.R. (4th) 37. 




union officials.  Two months later the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
unanimously upheld the trial judge’s judgment.16 
 
Leave to appeal to the SCC was sought on 29 September 2004 and granted 
on 21 April 2005.  By that time, the process of privatizing the jobs of 
health support workers was well advanced.  Some 8,500 jobs were shifted 
from the public to the private sector and wages in the affected positions 
were cut by more than 40 per cent, benefits were slashed, workloads were 
increased and job security eliminated.17  Argument was heard on 8 
February 2006.  In the interim, the court issued two decisions, which did 
not bode well for the appellants.  The first, Newfoundland (Treasury 
Board) v. Newfoundland and Labrador Assn. of Public and Private 
Employees (N.A.P.E.), held that while legislation infringing a pay equity 
agreement violated women’s equality rights, the measure was 
demonstrably justified because of the fiscal crisis facing the 
Newfoundland government.18  The second, Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney 
General), opened the door to privatization of the health system where it 
could be demonstrated that the public system was failing to provide timely 
access to necessary medical procedures.19  In combination, the result of 
these cases seemed to indicate that the court would be sympathetic to a 
government initiative whose stated aim was to improve the delivery of 
health care while addressing its rapidly increasing cost, making this case 
seem a poor choice for seeking a reversal of the court’s longstanding 
position that collective bargaining was not protected under the Charter.  
So it was a surprise to most court watchers when the court issued its 
judgment doing just that. 
 
 
                                                 
16 (2004), 30 B.C.L.R. (4th) 377. 
17 Stinson, Pains of Privatization. 
18 [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381. 
19 [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791.  
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III. THE JUDGMENT 
 
This is not the place to offer an extensive legal analysis of the court’s 
decision, but it is necessary to set out its basic argument.20  The judgment 
begins with a thoroughgoing critique of the court’s previous reasons for 
excluding collective bargaining from the ambit of freedom of 
association.21  In itself, this is quite unusual.  The court then proceeds to 
make the case for including freedom of association based on Canadian 
history, international law, and Charter values.  We will return to a more 
detailed examination of its labour history shortly, but it is worth saying a 
few words here about the other grounds.  The international law argument 
is largely based on the interpretation of freedom of association in 
international conventions to which Canada is a party, and in particular to 
ILO Convention 87, which extends to collective bargaining.  The court 
concludes that “s. 2(d) of the Charter should be interpreted as recognizing 
at least the same level of protection” as is found in these international 
instruments.22  
 
The Charter values justification offered by the court will make trade 
unionists blush.  It is effusive in its praise of the benefits of collective 
bargaining.  “The right to bargain collectively with an employer enhances 
the human dignity, liberty and autonomy of workers by giving them the 
opportunity to influence the establishment of workplace rules and thereby 
gain some control over a major aspect of their lives, namely their work.”23  
“Collective bargaining also enhances the Charter value of equality.  One 
of the fundamental achievements of collective bargaining is to palliate the 
historical inequality between employers and employees.”24  “Finally, a 
                                                 
20 For a more detailed analysis, see Judy Fudge, “The Supreme Court of Canada and the 
Right to Bargain Collectively: The Implications of the Health Services and Support case 
in Canada and Beyond,” Industrial Law Journal (forthcoming 2008). 
21 Paragraphs 22-37. 
22 Paragraph 79.  This part of their judgment has been subject to a withering critique by 
Brian Langille, “Can We Rely on the ILO? (Don’t Ask the Supreme Court of Canada),” 
Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal (forthcoming 2008). 
23 Paragraph 82. 
24 Paragraph 84. 




constitutional right to collective bargaining is supported by the Charter 
value of enhancing democracy.  Collective bargaining permits workers to 
achieve a form of workplace democracy and to ensure the rule of law in 
the workplace.”25 
 
But what exactly is the scope of the Charter-protected right to bargain 
collectively?    Here the tone of the judgment changes from the expansive 
rhetoric found in the justifications to a much more defensive and tentative 
one.  The court offers several different and inconsistent formulations of its 
bottom line.  For example, in paragraph 2 the court states, “We conclude 
that the s. 2(d) guarantee of freedom of association protects the capacity of 
members of labour unions to engage in collective bargaining on 
workplace issues” [my emphasis].  This is substantially repeated at 
paragraph 19, with the added qualification that the right is to bargain over 
“fundamental” workplace issues, but further stipulations immediately 
follow.  The Charter does not protect all aspects of collective bargaining; 
it does not ensure a particular bargaining outcome; and it does not 
guarantee access to any particular statutory scheme of collective 
bargaining. Somewhat oddly, after identifying these restrictions the court 
articulates its broadest formulation of its holding.  “What is protected is 
simply the right of employees to associate in a process of collective action 
to achieve workplace goals”26 [my emphasis].  Unlike in the previous 
formulations, this one extends the Charter’s protection to all employees, 
not just trade union members, and to all workers’ collective action, not just 
collective bargaining.  While the first extension remains in subsequent 
formulations of the holding, the second does not.  Indeed, the majority is 
quick to state that its decision does not concern the right to strike.27  The 
bottom line that eventually emerges is best stated in paragraph 87: “The 
preceding discussion leads to the conclusion that s. 2(d) should be 
understood as protecting the right of employees to associate for the 
                                                 
25 Paragraph 85. 
26 Paragraph 19. 
27  Paragraph 19.  It should be noted that the court does not specifically confirm its 
previous holding that the freedom of association does not protect the right to strike.  
Rather, it states that this judgment does not address this question.  Presumably, the court 
will be asked to reconsider its position in the near future. 
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purposes of advancing workplace goals through a process of collective 
bargaining.” 
 
Having determined that the Charter right protects the process of collective 
bargaining and nothing more, the court then turns to the question of what 
duties this right entails, but first several more qualifications follow. First, 
there must be state action, which occurs either when the government 
legislates or is the employer.  The effect of this limitation, which flows 
from the structure of the Charter, is that the decision will have limited 
impact on private sector collective bargaining law.28  Second, , the court 
repeats its qualification that freedom of association does not guarantee the 
objectives sought by the association, but only the process through which 
those objectives are pursued.29 Third, the court states that freedom of 
association does not protect all aspects of the associational activity of 
collective bargaining, but only against “substantial interference” with that 
activity, a matter which is subsequently discussed in greater detail.30  What 
then is the duty that the right entails?  “It requires both employer and 
employees to meet and to bargain in good faith, in the pursuit of a 
common goal of peaceful and productive accommodation.”31   The court is 
absolutely correct when it then concludes, “The right to collective 
bargaining thus conceived is a limited right.”32     
 
Lawyers will spend many hours (and lots of clients’ money) arguing over 
the precise meaning of all this, but the most fundamental point that comes 
through the judgment is that government has a duty to bargain in good 
faith with organized groups of workers.  In this particular context, the 
constitutionally protected right to bargain collectively requires the 
government to negotiate with its unionized employees over any proposed 
                                                 
28 The impact of this decision on private sector labour legislation will undoubtedly be 
explored in future cases, but for the present it would seem that it will be limited to the 
claim that under-inclusive laws preclude workers from being able to exercise freedom of 
association.  This claim was accepted in Dunmore. 
29 Paragraph 89. 
30 Paragraphs 94-109. 
31 Paragraph 90. 
32 Paragraph 91. 




changes to existing collective agreements.  This does not mean that the 
government cannot eventually pass legislation that strips rights from 
existing collective agreements, but such legislation must be preceded by 
good faith consultation and bargaining over these rights.  The court was 
unanimous in finding that several sections of Bill 29 infringed the 
workers’ collective bargaining rights. 
   
Finally, the court considered the government’s section 1 argument that 
even if the government violated workers’ Charter-protected rights, its 
action was demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.  The 
majority held that the government’s argument failed because it neither 
considered less intrusive methods for achieving its goals nor consulted 
with the unions involved.  Deschamps, J. dissented on this point.  As the 
author of the majority judgment in Chaoulli she was perhaps more 
responsive to the BC government’s argument that its action was a 
defensible effort to address the crisis of sustainability in the public health 
care system and would have found that most of Bill 29’s infringements of 
the process of collective bargaining were demonstrably justified.33   
 
The court briefly disposed of the equality rights argument, upholding a 
line of precedent that the unequal treatment of different sectors of the 
labour force does not violate s. 15 of the Charter because it is based on the 
type of work people do rather than on the personal characteristics of the 
workers.34 
 
IV. LABOUR HISTORY IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CANADA 
 
Before turning to the court’s labour law history, it will be helpful to 
understand its role in the judgment.  As noted, the court held in earlier 
judgments that the right to freedom of association does not protect 
collective bargaining.  Several reasons were offered to justify that 
conclusion, one of which was the rights to strike and bargain collectively 
                                                 
33 Paragraphs 228-50. 
34 Paragraphs 162-67. 
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were “modern rights” created by legislation, not “fundamental 
freedoms.”35  As a result, they were not constitutionally protected aspects 
of freedom of association, and labour legislation was designated as an area 
in which the courts should be especially deferential to the legislature’s 
balancing of competing claims.  LeDain J.’s majority judgment, however, 
provided no historical evidence to support its conclusion that the right to 
bargain collectively was “modern” and so his methodology might be 
characterized as an example of what the American historian, Alfred H. 
Kelly, scathingly referred to as the creation of history by “judicial fiat” or 
“authoritative revelation.”36   
 
One way of challenging the validity of this line of precedent, therefore, 
was to attack its historical premise.   
 
A second way of undermining the strength of the earlier line of precedent 
was to argue that the framers of the Charter intended that freedom of 
association would protect the right to bargain collectively.  This requires a 
different legal-historical argument, although one that might build upon the 
labour history argument.  It also assumes that the framers’ intent is 
relevant, which is a rather dicey proposition in Canada.  Nevertheless, as 
we shall see, the SCC did enter onto this terrain, however tentatively.   
 
The role of history, then, was twofold: first, to criticize the historical 
reasoning that underpinned the court’s earlier exclusion of collective 
bargaining from constitutionally protected freedom of associations and, 
second, to provide a justification for finding that it ought to be included.  
But how was the court to go about making its historical argument?  A new 
historical fiat was possible, but because the view that collective bargaining 
was a modern right had already become the “common law of history”37 the 
burden of proof implicitly shifted to those asserting a contrary position, 
and so it seemed advantageous to marshal some historical evidence to 
support the claim that the right to collective bargaining was longstanding 
                                                 
35 Alberta Reference, 391. 
36 Alfred H. Kelly, “Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair,” Supreme Court Review 
1965, 122.   
37 Neil M. Richards, “Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court’s Use of 
History,” Journal of Law and Politics, 13 (Fall 1997), 889.  




and recognized as fundamental prior to 1982 when the Charter came into 
force.   
 
Procedurally, there were several options for making this argument.  An 
expert witness affidavit could have been prepared by an historian retained 
by one of the litigants, but this was not done.  Rather, John Baigent and 
Randall Noonan, lawyers for one of the interveners, the British Columbia 
Federation of Teachers, prepared a factum, or statement of its argument 
and the sources on which its based, which contained a seventeen 
paragraph history of the development of collective bargaining in Canada.  
The gist of the argument was that the right of workers to bargain 
collectively was not a mere creation of modern statute, but rather was 
based on “pre-existing fundamental rights to trade unionism, collective 
bargaining and collective withdrawal of labour.”38   The brief relied 
largely on work written within the industrial pluralist framework, 
including an article by Bora Laskin written during World War II and a 
standard labour law text.39 The brief did not make an argument about the 
framers’ intent.   
 
This is not the place to comment on the substance of the teachers’ brief, 
but a word about its methodology is in order.  Essentially, it fits within the 
genre that Kelly described as “law-office” history, and that Horwitz 
described as “lawyers’ legal history.”40  This is legal history written to 
generate data and interpretations that are of use in resolving modern legal 
controversies.  To make this history effective, it is best told in a simple 
and appealing way.  The nuance and complexity that is the hallmark of 
good historical work is not welcome in a legal brief prepared for 
instrumental reasons.41  Thus, while most labour historians would likely be 
                                                 
38 British Columbia Teachers’ Federation, Brief to the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Ass. V. British Columbia, 
(16 January 2006), para. 25.   
39 Id. Bora Laskin, “Collective Bargaining in Canada: In Peace and In War,” Food for 
Thought, Journal of the Canadian Association for Adult Education, 2:3 (November 
1941), 8-17; George W. Adams, Canadian Labour Law, 2nd ed. (Aurora, ON 1993). 
40 Kelly, “Clio,” 122; Morton J. Horwitz, “The Conservative Tradition in American Legal 
History,” American Journal of Legal History, 17 (July 1973), 276. 
41 For similar observations, see John Phillip Reid, “Law and History,” Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review 27 (November 1993), 193-223. 
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reluctant to support the unqualified historical conclusion that the adoption 
of Wagner Act model legislation in Canada “does not create, but rather 
carries forward and is based on pre-existing fundamental rights to trade 
unionism, collective bargaining and collective withdrawal of labour,”42 for 
the lawyers that was at least a facially plausible claim that supported their 
client’s case. 
 
The use of history by courts, it might be argued, is less likely to be driven 
by instrumental reasoning than is the case with advocates.  Judges, after 
all, are not being paid handsomely to marshal arguments in favour of a 
client’s interest.  Yet it would be naïve to envisage the judicial process as a 
disinterested search for truth.  While we might speculate on what 
motivated the court to choose this case at this time to overturn its own 
precedents, we cannot know for sure.  In its judgment, the court cites 
several reasons, including Canadian labour history, international law 
norms and Charter values, yet it is not clear why these considerations are 
being weighed only now when they were equally available in 1987 when 
the court rejected them.  Indeed, in the interim, the historical trajectory of 
Canadian support for collective bargaining has been downwards, making it 
more difficult to say that collective bargaining is widely recognized as a 
fundamental right in Canada.43  Similarly, the commitment of the 
Canadian governments to adhere to ILO obligations also seems to have 
further eroded over the past twenty years.44    
 
Whatever its reasons for deciding a case in a particular way, once the 
outcome is determined judges are likely to write their judgment 
instrumentally, like lawyers do, especially when they are overruling a 
previous decision and so are likely to feel a heightened burden of 
                                                 
42 British Columbia Teachers’ Federation  Brief, paragraph 25.  
43 For an overview of developments, see Mark Thompson et al., eds. Beyond the National 
Divide: Regional Dimensions of Industrial Relations (Montreal 2003) and Leo Panitch 
and Donald Swartz, From Consent to Coercion: The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms 
(Aurora, ON 2003); Gene Swimmer, ed. Public Sector Labour Relations in an Era of 
Restraint and Restructuring (Don Mils, ON 2001). 
44 Panitch & Swartz, From Consent, 54-7, 208-9; Norman, “Promises.”  It is true, 
however, that the since 1987 the court has taken more account of international law in its 
interpretation of the Charter.  See Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration) [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3. 




justification.45 In this context, the preference for lawyers’ history is likely 
to be just as strong for judges as it is for advocates.  Nuanced and complex 
historical accounts will not do when the court needs to present an 
historical conclusion as unambiguously true and authoritative.  Canadian 
historian Donald Bourgeois found this to be the case in a comment on the 
role of the historian as expert witness. “The historian should be aware that 
the purpose of litigation is to settle a dispute with finality.  Whether or not 
the decision is historically ‘correct’ is, from one perspective – that of the 
court – irrelevant…..The court, ideally, attempts to determine the ‘truth’ or 
‘what really happened,’ but that determination is incidental to its role in 
society….46  This context creates a high risk not only that the court will 
produce history that in the view of two other Canadian historians, G.M. 
Dickinson and R.D. Gidney, lacks “context and qualification” and reduces 
“a complex and sophisticated historical argument to the level of a crude 
and embarrassing parody,” 47 but also that it will make ironic use of 
historical sources, by which I mean the use of historians’ work to construct 
a narrative that their work actually discredits.  
 
As we shall see, these risks materialized in the Supreme Court’s judgment.  
The judges were not content to rely on the Teachers’ brief for their history, 
but presumably instructed one or more of their clerks to conduct additional 
research.  It was at this stage that the work of critical labour historians and 
labour law scholars was drawn into the process, even while their 
interpretations were ignored. 
 
The historical “truth” that the court needed to prove is that collective 
bargaining is a fundamental right in Canada and not the creation of 
modern labour relations statutes.  The court makes this claim in the 
                                                 
45 Reid, “Law and History,” 204, made the point quite sharply.  “When [judges] tell their 
law clerks to find them some ‘history’ supporting a point of law they plan to promulgate, 
their interest lies in authority, not in evidence…In almost every instance when history is 
employed, the decision has already been formulated.  Unprofessional history is used to 
explain the decision, to make it more palatable, or, in most cases, to justify the decision.”  
46 Donald J. Bourgeois, “The Role of the Historian in the Litigation Process,” Canadian 
Historical Review 67 (June 1986), 197-98. 
47 G.M. Dickinson and R.D. Gidney, “History and Advocacy: Some Reflections on the 
Historian’s Role in Litigation,” Canadian Historical Review 68 (December 1987), 582. 
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preface to the labour history section of its judgment.  “Association for 
purposes of collective bargaining has long been recognized as a 
fundamental Canadian right which predated the Charter.  This suggests 
that the framers of the Charter intended to include it in the protection of 
freedom of association found in s.2(d) of the Charter."48  This is followed 
one paragraph later by a lengthy quote from the 1968 Woods Task Force 
Report, which the court identifies as providing the definitive summary of 
Canadian labour history.   
 
[W]orkers began to join unions and engage in 
collective bargaining with their employers.  Although 
employers resisted this development with all the resources 
at their command, it eventually became apparent that 
unions and collective bargaining were natural concomitants 
of a mixed enterprise economy.  The state then assumed the 
task of establishing a framework of rights and 
responsibilities within which management and organized 
labour were to conduct their relations.49 
 
Having embraced an industrial pluralist historiography, which sees the 
development of collective bargaining in functionalist terms as a natural 
process of interest adjustment in the name of achieving a greater common 
good, the court adopts the three stages of history approach associated with 
that school: repression, toleration, and recognition.  At this point, the court 
acknowledges that this categorization “may not necessarily draw a 
perfectly accurate picture of the evolution of labour law in our country” 
and cites for that proposition an article of mine.50  In that piece I argued 
that the three-stage historiography “served the function of justifying 
current collective bargaining schemes by showing them to be the 
progressive realization of political and industrial pluralism.”  I then went 
                                                 
48 Paragraph 40.   
49 Paragraph 42; Canadian Industrial Relations:  Report of Task Force on Labour 
Relations (Ottawa1969), 13. 
50 Paragraph 44; Eric Tucker, “The Faces of Coercion: The Legal Regulation of Labour 
Conflict in Ontario, 1880-1889,” Law and History Review 12 (Fall 1994), 277-339. 




on to state, “Confidence in the narrative is, however, eroding.”51  Well, 
maybe among labour historians, but apparently not for SCC judges who 
immediately follow their acknowledgement of their narrative’s 
imperfection with a statement that hints at their instrumentalism in putting 
history to the service of defending an exalted and, with due respect, 
fantastic view of industrial pluralism.  “However, for the present purposes, 
such categorization provides a sufficient historical framework in which to 
summarize the evolution of our law and to underline the flourishing of 
labour unions and collective bargaining as well as the historic openness of 
government and society to those organizations over the past century.”52   
 
The judgment then works its way through the three stages of history.  In 
the period of repression, the court focuses on the English Combination 
Acts and the hostility of common law judges to workers’ collective action, 
while acknowledging the uncertainty surrounding the question of whether 
that body of law was applied in Canada. It concludes this section with 
Bryan Palmer’s summation in Working-Class Experience that at least prior 
to 1872 Canadian law “cast shadows on the legitimacy of trade 
unions….”53 Next comes a brief discussion of the period of toleration, 
which covers from 1872 to about 1900.  Here the court recounts the 
passage of the 1872 Trade Unions Act and quotes a summary of the law at 
the turn of the 20th century from Fudge and Tucker, Labour Before the 
Law, which states that workers enjoyed a legal privilege to form unions 
but not a state-protected right to do so.54  The court also recognizes that 
workers enjoyed the legal freedom to strike under this regime and that 
most strikes were caused by the refusal of employers to bargain with the 
union.   
 
The court turns to the period of recognition, beginning with the 1907 
Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, which, relying on Jeremy Webber’s 
work and others, it characterizes as a failure because employers’ had no 
                                                 
51 Id., 277. 
52 Paragraph 44.  
53 Paragraph 50: Bryan D. Palmer, Working-Class Experience: Rethinking the History of 
Canadian Labour, 1800-1991 (Toronto 1992), 66. 
54 Paragraph 53; Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, Labour Before the Law (Toronto 2001), 2.  
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incentive to participate in the process.55  The Depression and industrial 
“tension” in the 1930s “rendered” the laissez-faire model “inappropriate” 
in the United States, leading to the adoption of the Wagner Act.56  The 
court extracts a statement of the objects of the Wagner Act from an article 
by the influential American critical labour law scholar, Karl Klare,57 and 
turns to Canada and P.C. 1003, citing a description of its legal effects 
taken from an article by Judy Fudge and Harry Glasbeek.58  The court 
accepts that P.C. 1003 was a political compromise that on the one hand 
granted workers the rights to organize without fear of unfair interference 
and to bargain collectively in good faith with their employers, while on the 
other, guaranteed employers a measure of stability by limiting the use of 
economic sanctions.  Turning to public sector collective bargaining, the 
also court acknowledges that it came later, between 1965 and 1973, and 
that the rights conferred on public sector workers were more restricted.  
This is supported by a long passage from Fudge and Glasbeek.59  The 
court also acknowledges, citing Joe Rose, that governments have 
frequently and unilaterally imposed terms and conditions on its public 
sector workers through legislation.60  None of this detracts from the 
court’s conclusion, in the next paragraph, that there has been steady 
progress in the development of the right to collective bargaining, which 
was first exercised in the shadow of the law, then was asserted against 
employers through the strike weapon, and finally, was recognized as a 
“fundamental need” by the adoption of the Wagner Act model in Canada.61 
                                                 
55 Paragraph 55; Jeremy Webber, “Compelling Compromise: Canada Chooses 
Conciliation Over Arbitration, 1900-1907,” Labour/Le Travail 28 (Autumn 1991), 15.   
56 Paragraph 56.  
57 Paragraph 57; Karl Klare, “Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins 
of Modern Legal Consciousness,” Minnesota Law Review 62 (March 1978), 281-85. 
58 Paragraph 59; Judy Fudge and Harry Glasbeek, “The Legacy of PC 1003,” Canadian 
Labour and Employment Law Journal 3 (1995), 358.   
59 Paragraph 61; Fudge and Glasbeek, 385.   
60 Paragraph 62; Joseph B. Rose, “Public Sector Bargaining: From Retrenchment to 
Consolidation,” Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations 59 (Spring 2004), 271-93.   
61 Paragraph 63. 




The historical section of the court’s judgment concludes with a brief 
discussion of collective bargaining in the Charter era.  The aim of this 
section is to argue that by 1982 it was clearly understood that freedom of 
association in the labour context included a procedural right to collective 
bargaining.  This is accomplished by referring again to the 1968 Woods 
Task Force Report, the 1972 amendments to the preamble to the Canada 
Labour Code that incorporated the Task Force’s recommendations, and a 
statement made by Robert Kaplan, the then acting Justice Minister, during 
the Parliamentary hearings that took place before the adoption of the 
Charter, that it was the government’s view that the freedom to organize 
and bargain collectively was covered by freedom of association.62 
 
The narrative of progress concludes by casting the protection enshrined in 
s. 2(d) of the Charter as “the culmination of a historical movement 
towards the recognition of a procedural right to collective bargaining,”63 
implying this occurred in 1982 rather than 2007, so that the court is not 
creating new constitutional rights but rather finding ones that are ‘in’ the 
Charter.   
 
The court also draws on a second line of historical analysis that is partly 
related to the first, and that is the claim in paragraph 40 that the “framers 
of the Charter intended to include [collective bargaining] in the protection 
of freedom of association found in s. 2 (d) of the Charter.”  To a great 
extent, this conclusion is a bootstrap argument: if historically a right to 
bargain collectively has long been recognized as a fundamental aspect of 
the right to freedom of association, then it is arguable that the protection of 
freedom of association in the Charter was intended to cover collective 
bargaining without further evidence.  The claim stands or falls with the 
strength of the court’s historical analysis, and that is the way it is made in 
paragraph 40.  It is, however, somewhat surprising that the “intent of the 
framers” discourse makes an appearance in the court’s judgment, since up 
to this time the court has been quite explicit in rejecting this approach to 
Charter interpretation.  For example, in Re BC Motor Vehicle Act,  the 
court held that “fundamental justice” in section 7 had a substantive aspect 
notwithstanding that there was overwhelming evidence that during the 
                                                 
62 Paragraphs 64-67. 
63 Paragraph 68.  
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process of drafting and debate everyone intended that it was procedural 
only.  More recently, in Re Same Sex Marriage, the court explicitly 
rejected originalism in favour of the view that the constitution is a “living 
tree” to be interpreted progressively.64   Perhaps for that reason, the court 
did not directly argue that Robert Kaplan’s statement, noted above, was 
evidence of the intent of the framers, but rather that made the more modest 
claim it was an indication that the right to collective bargaining was 
recognized in the Parliamentary hearings.65 
 
V. THE IRONIC USE OF HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP 
 
There are many problems with the judgment.  My focus in this part is on 
its ironic use of history.  But before proceeding, I first want to argue that 
the court’s historical analysis fails to support the two historical 
propositions that it seeks to defend, namely that “Association for purposes 
of collective bargaining has long been recognized as a fundamental 
Canadian right which predated the Charter” and the claim that “the 
framers of the Charter intended to include it in the protection of freedom 
of association found in s. 2(d) of the Charter.”66   
 
Part of the problem with the court’s labour history is that it elides the 
distinctions between collective bargaining as an activity in which self-
directed workers engage regardless of its legal status, as a legally 
privileged activity or freedom in the sense that it is not prohibited by the 
state, and as a legally protected right with correlative duties on employers 
and the state to bargain in good faith.  It is certainly true that there is a 
long-standing practice of Canadian workers associating for the purpose of 
bargaining collectively with their employers.  Moreover, it is also true 
that, at the very least since 1872 and probably before, workers enjoyed a 
                                                 
64 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486; [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, para. 22.   One of the justices in the Health 
Services case, Ian Binnie, recently wrote an article opposing originalism.  See Ian Binnie, 
“Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent,” Supreme Court Law Review (2d), 23 
(2004), 345-82. 
65 Paragraph 67. 
66 Paragraph 40.   




legal privilege or freedom to associate for the purpose of bargaining 
collectively with their employers without fear of being prosecuted or sued 
simply for doing so.  The establishment of a legal right for workers to 
associate for the purposes of forming a trade union, in the sense that 
employers are subject to a concomitant duty not to interfere with their 
organizing, however, can only be traced to the freedom of trade union 
association legislation passed in the 1930s, while the legal right for 
workers to bargain collectively, in the sense that employers have a positive 
duty to participate in a process of good faith negotiation with their 
workers’ chosen representatives first appeared in British Columbia and 
Nova Scotia statutes enacted in 1937, but only became generalized for 
private sector workers in the 1940s and for public sector workers in the 
1960s and 70s.67   
 
Thus while the court is on firm historical ground when it states in 
paragraph 66 that collective bargaining (understood here as a social 
practice) has long been recognized in Canada (in the sense that it could 
neither be repressed nor ignored) and that “historically it emerges as the 
most significant collective activity through which freedom of association 
is expressed in the labour context,” its further claim that a procedural right 
to collective bargaining has long been recognized as fundamental in 
Canada prior to 1982 is deeply problematic as a statement of historical 
fact.   
 
To the extent that its second historical claim regarding the framers’ intent 
is based on its first claim about the long recognition of a right to collective 
bargaining by 1982, then it too is problematic, but the court tries 
somewhat elliptically to bolster its case for the framers’ intent by quoting 
Robert Kaplan’s statement, noted above.  Upon closer examination, 
however, the statement is not nearly as probative as the court implies.  The 
question of the scope of freedom of association arose when NDP member 
Svend Robinson proposed an amendment to section 2(d) that would 
specifically include “the freedom to organize and bargain collectively” 
(my emphasis) in the guarantee of freedom of association.  When 
introducing the amendment Robinson stated quite specifically that his 
amendment would not cover the right to strike.  Nevertheless, some 
                                                 
67 Fudge and Tucker, Labour, 205-27;  
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members including Jake Epp, a Progressive-Conservative member, were 
concerned about this possibility and so Epp asked Robinson to confirm 
that the amendment would not affect the right to strike, which he did, and 
then requested Robert Kaplan to provide the government’s position.  
Kaplan response was that the government was of the view that freedom to 
organize and bargain collectively is already covered in freedom of 
association.  He also added that the government agreed with Robinson that 
the right to strike “would not necessarily be affected” by inclusion of the 
proposed amendment.68 
 
We can leave aside the question of the right to strike, except to note that 
any turn to originalism would detrimentally affect the possibility of unions 
successfully arguing in the future that it is included in Charter-protected 
freedom of association.  Rather, the question is whether Kaplan’s 
statement supports the view that the framers intended that freedom of 
association would protect a right to bargain collectively.  Here again we 
see an elision between rights and freedoms.  Neither Robinson nor Kaplan 
ever said what they actually meant by “the freedom to organize and 
bargain collectively.”  Did either or both of them truly just meant a 
“freedom” in the sense of a legal privilege, or did they mean a legal right, 
in the sense that it would impose a constitutional obligation on the state to 
protect organizing and to bargain in good faith with organized employees. 
Bryce Mackasey, a former Liberal federal minister of labour from 1968 to 
1972, speaking on his own behalf, seemed to be getting at this distinction 
in his intervention on this issue, although he too did not make clear his 
understanding of what the phrase would mean.  “The problem with the 
unions comes not from their freedom of association, but to be recognized 
legally for another particular purpose; for instance the right to bargain on 
behalf of longshoremen….This is something you must negotiate.”69   
This is just one instance of the enormous difficulty that is encountered in 
making “framers’ intent” arguments, and lends support to the view that, 
even apart from the question of whether in principle it would be a 
                                                 
68 Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the Constitution of 
Canada, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Issue No. 43, January 22, 1981, at pp. 69-
70. 
69 Id, pp. 71-72 




desirable approach, it requires historians to answer a question that in most 
instances cannot be resolved with any certainty.70  
 
I am not arguing that the court should not recognize a procedural right to 
collective bargaining as fundamental and, therefore, protected as an 
exercise of constitutionally protected freedom of association.  That is a 
legal and normative claim for which legal and normative argument is 
required and, indeed, given elsewhere in the court’s judgment, based on 
international human rights norms and Charter values.  Rather, my 
argument here is much more limited: the court’s historical claims are 
flawed.  
 
This leads me then to the ironic use of history, which I defined earlier as 
the use of historical work to support a narrative that is inconsistent with 
the interpretation of that work (without acknowledging that difference of 
view).  Unlike the Teachers’ Brief, which relied on ‘safe’ (industrial 
pluralist) sources, the SCC’s judgment mines a much wider range of 
scholarly work, including the work of many academics who challenge the 
narrative of labour law’s linear progress from repression to toleration to 
recognition, and who view the Wagner Act model not as the apotheosis of 
freedom of association but as a political compromise that allowed workers 
to make some gains while also severely limiting and more tightly 
controlling their self-directed activity.  Here we might just briefly sample 
a few of the works cited by the court.   
 
I may be forgiven for beginning with a book I co-authored with Judy 
Fudge, Labour Before the Law, but I do so because its time frame is 
crucial for the court’s analysis, the period between 1900 and the enactment 
of “modern” statutory collective bargaining legislation.  Tellingly, the 
court does not refer to our book for anything we have to say about this 
period, but rather quotes our summation of the legal regime of liberal 
voluntarism that existed earlier in the introduction at page 2.71  This is not 
surprising given what we say two pages later.  
                                                 
70 There is an enormous literature on the subject.  For a Canadian critique of originalism, 
see Katherine Swinton, The Supreme Court and Canadian Federalism (Toronto 1990), ch. 
4.  For an American, see Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings Politics and Ideas in the 
Making of the Constitution (New York 1996). 
71 Paragraph 53. 
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While the emergence of the regime of industrial 
pluralism is the culmination of our narrative, ours is not a 
tale of linear progress from dark beginnings to the triumph 
of industrial democracy and freedom of association.  
Rather, our story is a much more nuanced one in which 
coercive and accommodative elements operate 
synchronously, in a variety of combinations, and 
diachronically, as new laws do not supersede older ones, 
but often supplement them, producing a complex legal 
regime.72 
Admittedly, the prose is not sparkling, but the point is clear enough.  Our 
book does not support the court’s historical narrative.  We use the 
construct of a regime because we wanted to show how at different points 
in time legal regulation combined elements of coercion, toleration and 
support in different ways.  Moreover, we applied that framework to our 
examination of the construction of industrial pluralism, arguing that the 
regime aimed to contain and shape the social practice of workers’ 
collective action as much as it was about recognizing and encouraging it.73  
But rather than acknowledge this difference of interpretation, the court 
chose simply to ignore it.   
 
This careless approach to sources recurs a few paragraphs later when the 
court quotes Karl Klare’s listing of the multiple aims of the Wagner Act.74  
The court, however, does not consider the larger argument that Klare 
makes, which is summarized at the conclusion of the section of his article 
in which the list appears.  
 
The remainder of this Article will attempt to 
demonstrate that, in shaping the nation’s labor law, the 
Court embraced those aims of the Act most consistent with 
the assumptions of liberal capitalism and foreclosed those 
potential paths of development most threatening to the 
                                                 
72 Fudge and Tucker, Labour, 4.   
73 Id., chs. 10 & 11. 
74 Paragraph 57. 




established order.  Thus, the Wagner Act’s goals of 
industrial peace, collective bargaining as therapy, a safely 
cabined worker free choice, and some rearrangement of 
relative bargaining power survived judicial construction of 
the Act, whereas the goals of redistribution, equality of 
bargaining power, and industrial democracy – although 
abiding in rhetoric – were jettisoned as serious components 
of national labor policy.75  
Again, rather than acknowledge Klare’s critical perspective on the 
development of American labour law, and its implications for the story it 
want to tell of the forward march of labour history, the court ignores it.   
In the court’s defence, it might be said that they really do not need to 
follow the development of American labour law, but rather simply wanted 
to identify the goals of the Wagner Act because it provided the model for 
Canadian labour legislation.  But they cannot escape so easily for they 
ignore very similar points made by Fudge and Glasbeek’s work, from 
which they extract a descriptive summation of the legal effect of PC 
1003.76  Immediately after that summation, though, Fudge and Glasbeek 
continue:  
  
But, despite the progress represented by this step, 
PC 1003 was not intended to alter the balance of power 
radically, that is, to ensure trade unions better agreements 
and/or to guarantee strong constraints on managerial 
prerogatives.  The underlying, unquestioned assumption of 
PC 1003 was that the touchstones of the then existing 
political economy were to remain intact.  The enhanced 
right to collective bargaining was to detract as little as 
possible from the idea that individual private sector 
entrepreneurs – possessed of the legal right to deploy their 
property as they chose – were to remain the motor of the 
political economy.  This starting point has had important 
                                                 
75 Klare, “Judicial Deradicalization,” 292-93. 
76 Paragraph 59. 
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consequences for institutionalized collective bargaining in 
Canada.77 
Later, the court quotes another paragraph from Fudge and Glasbeek on the 
more restrictive scheme of collective bargaining attained by public sector 
workers in the 1960s and 70s, and then, relying on an article by Joe Rose, 
identifies the increasing frequency during the 1980s and 1990s that those 
limited rights have been further restricted by legislation.  This ought to 
create a problem for a narrative of linear progress, but the court makes no 
attempt to incorporate these observations into its analysis.  Rather, it 
simply jumps to its summary: that by adopting the Wagner Act model 
“governments across Canada recognized the fundamental need for workers 
to participate in the regulation of their work environment.”78 
 
I could go on through a discussion of Palmer’s work79 and others, but I 
think the point is clear.  The court ignores evidence and interpretations in 
the works that it cites that are inconsistent with the historical narrative it 
wishes to construct of linear progress toward the recognition of collective 
bargaining as a fundamental right in Canada and its realization in the 
Wagner Act model.80 
 
                                                 
77 Fudge and Glasbeek, “Legacy,” 359. 
78 Paragraphs 61-63; Fudge and Glasbeek, “Legacy,” 385.  In that article Rose concludes 
(at 289) “Taken together, these forces suggest governments are not prepared to restore a 
genuine collective bargaining system and unions are not in a position to compel them to 
do so.” 
79 In addition to his Working-Class Experience, which was cited by the court, readers 
may wish to consult Bryan D. Palmer, “What’s Law Got to Do With It? Historical 
Considerations on Class Struggle, Boundaries of Constraint, and Capitalist Authority,” 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 41 (Summer/Fall 2003), 466-90 for a clear statement of his 
position on the coercive dimension of industrial legality.  
80  This is not the first time that the Supreme Court of Canada has cherry-picked an 
excerpt from academic work to support a conclusion opposite to the one drawn by the 
quoted author, without ever acknowledging the difference.  A well-known instance 
occurred in Harrison v. Carswell [1976] 2 S.C.R. 200 where the majority judgment by 
Dickson, J. extracted an excerpt from an article by Harry Arthurs, “Labour Law – 
Picketing on Shopping Centres,” Canadian Bar Review, 43 (1965), 357-63, to support the 
absolute right of the shopping centre owner to exclude labour picketing when Arthurs 
was in favour of allowing limited picketing.  




VI. THE IRONIES OF HISTORY 
 
But so what if Supreme Court judges write lawyers’ history to produce a 
narrative in support of instrumental ends.  Supreme Court judges are not 
academic historians writing for other academics, but rather are engaged in 
making, interpreting and applying law.  Arguably, then, their work should 
not be assessed by academic standards, but by its results, in this case the 
constitutional protection of the collective bargaining process.  Is it just bad 
politics and, perhaps, sheer churlishness to criticize the court for writing 
bad labour history rather than to praise it for overturning bad precedents 
and providing workers with a constitutional shield against government 
assaults on trade union rights?   
 
The problem with that argument is that an uncritical celebration of the 
court’s judgment fuels, to use Roy Adams phrase, coined in a different 
context, a “pernicious euphoria”81 based on an exaggerated understanding 
of what the decision accomplishes.82  The purpose of this section, 
therefore, is to explore the limitations of the judgment through two 
historical ironies.  The first considers the historical irony of the court 
emerging as the defender of workers’ collective rights at the beginning of 
the 21st  century when for most of the previous two centuries it  evinced 
enormous hostility to workers’ collective action.  The second is the irony 
of the court embracing the collective bargaining process at a moment in 
time when it is less likely than ever to secure the substantive values the 
court claims that it advances.   
 
For almost any student of labour law or labour history, the court’s 
positioning of itself as defender of the collective rights of workers against 
assaults by the legislative and executive arms of the state is a stunning 
development.  This is not just the view of critical labour lawyers and 
historians.  Industrial pluralists long viewed the courts and the common 
                                                 
81 Roy J. Adams, “A Pernicious Euphoria: 50 Years of Wagnerism in Canada,” Canadian 
Labour and Employment Law Journal 3 (1995), 321-55. 
82 For example, see Duncan Cameron, “Supreme Court rules that labour rights are Charter 
rights,” The CCPA Monitor (July/August 2007), 10 (“The Canadian labour movement 
can now look forward to a brighter future in pursuing collective bargaining rights on 
fundamental workplace issues.”);  
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law as the enemy of workers’ collective action and an imperative of their 
blueprint for institutional reform was to limit their role.  Moreover, there is 
ample historical evidence to support their view of the courts, both before 
and after the enactment of modern statutory collective bargaining 
schemes.  Courts used the common law to limit narrowly the scope for 
worker collective action and later to contain the powers of labour relations 
boards and labour arbitrators.  Although in its historical narrative, the 
Supreme Court refers to repressive common law doctrines in the 18th and 
19th centuries, it makes no mention of the judiciary’s intolerant attitude 
toward and repression of workers’ collective during the so-called periods 
of legal toleration and support.83   
 
How can we explain this rather remarkable development and what 
significance, if any, does it have for an assessment of the court’s new role 
as self-proclaimed defender of workers’ collective action?   I do not intend 
to speculate on the court’s motivation for shifting its position, but rather to 
draw attention to the context in which it has occurred. The emergence of 
the court as the protector of collective bargaining has taken place 
following a lengthy period of what Panitch and Swartz aptly described as 
“permanent exceptionalism,” characterized by Canadian governments’ 
retreat from support for collective bargaining in the private-, and, even 
more so, in the public and para-public sectors.84  Moreover, employers 
have gone on the offensive against organized labour, resisting unionization 
where no unions exist and demanding concessions where they do.  In 
short, unions are weaker now than they have been in decades, suffering 
from declining political muscle and economic bargaining leverage.  Not 
only does their weakness drive them to the courts for protection against 
the state, it is also arguable that it is a condition of the court’s shift from 
hostility toward to support of collective bargaining.  A strong labour 
movement was feared, while a weak one can safely be presented as a 
vehicle for advancing democracy and equality.  Perhaps this change in 
                                                 
83 For a discussion of role of the common law courts prior to the adoption of the Wagner 
Act model, see Fudge and Tucker, Labour, passim.  For the post-World War II era, P.C. 
Weiler, “The ‘Slippery Slope’ of Judicial Intervention,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 9 
(August 1971), 1-79; H.W. Arthurs, “Developing Industrial Citizenship: A Challenge for 
Canada’s Second Century,” Canadian Bar Review 45 (December 1967), 823-29. 
84 Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz, From Consent to Coercion, 3rd ed., (Aurora: ON 
2003). 




union fortunes helps explain the difference between 1987, when the court 
denied that collective bargaining was protected freedom of association, 
and 2007.  It may also help explain the difference between 1963 when the 
Ontario Court of Appeal held that secondary picketing was per se tortious 
and 2003 when the Supreme Court held it was legal in the absence of 
independent wrongs.85 
 
If, ironically, legal victories are won because of union weakness rather 
than union strength, this should be cause for concern.  The declining 
strength of the labour movement has undermined its ability to protect the 
interests of its members and of workers more generally through its 
traditional syndicalist and political strategies.  This was amply 
demonstrated both in the events that gave rise to the BC Health Services 
case and in the events that followed it.  While the turn to constitutional 
litigation may be understood as a continuation of the labour movement’s 
post-World War II embrace of legality, the change in the form of legality 
is significant and potentially dangerous.  Firstly, there is the general 
problem of the legalization of politics which entails the shift from more to 
less democratic forms of governance.  This clearly occurs when the locus 
of industrial law creation moves from the collective bargaining agreement 
and the legislature (and their respective interpreters, labour arbitrators and 
labour relations boards) to Charter litigation.  In the former, although 
labour leaders generally counseled compliance with the contract and state 
law, they also understood that periodic mobilizations were necessary to 
win better collective agreements and stronger labour laws.  The pursuit of 
legalized politics through Charter litigation leaves even less space for 
grass-roots activism and struggle that uses a class-based discourse of 
rights.  As many critics have argued,  the Charter’s underlying ideology is 
regressive, focusing not on the unequal distribution of property among 
private parties, but rather on restraining state power that might be used to 
                                                 
85 R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 
156 reversing Hersees of Woodstock Ltd. V. Goldstein (1963), 38 D.L.R. (2d) 449 (ON 
CA).  Also, see Larry Savage, “Organized Labour and the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms,” Supreme Court Law Review (2nd Series) 36 (2007), 175-199 at 196 
(“…[R]ecent Charter victories do not showcase organized labour’s strength.  In fact, in 
many ways, recent Supreme Court decisions have highlighted the labour movement’s 
weakness in an era of neoliberal economic restructuring.”) 
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redress such inequality.86   Although the pursuit of legalized politics 
produced a legal victory in this case, it is arguable that in the long run the 
practice of syndicalism or democratic politics built on a class-based 
discourse is more likely to advance working-class interests over the long 
run than is Charter litigation based on a liberal rights discourse.  Of 
course, the pursuit of Charter remedies does not preclude syndicalist and 
popular democratic mobilizations, but it is likely to tilt labour movement 
practices even more strongly toward those associated with industrial 
pluralist legality.87 
 
Secondly, if judicial protection of workers’ collective rights is premised on 
a view of unions as victims, it suggests that the moment that courts 
perceive unions to be powerful actors then they will find ways to limit the 
rights they have recognized.  This can be done in many ways.  As this case 
itself indicates, the SCC can and does change its interpretation of the 
Charter.  Moreover, even without any substantive change to Charter 
interpretation, the decision itself provides courts with ample wiggle room 
to uphold government legislation interfering with collective agreements if 
they wish to do so.   First, remember that what is protected is a process of 
good faith bargaining.  Arguably, a government that first negotiated in 
good faith with a union about contract concessions and then, having failed 
to reach an agreement, legislatively imposed them, would not be held to 
have violated Charter-protected collective bargaining rights.  Moreover, 
even if this was found to be a violation, the government would still have a 
chance to argue that the violation was demonstrably justified under section 
1 on the ground that it was pursuing a pressing and substantial objective, 
                                                 
86 For example, see Andrew Petter, “Wealthcare: The Politics of the Charter Revisited,” 
in Colleen M. Flood, Kent Roach and Lorne Sossin, eds., Access to Care, Access to 
Justice (Toronto 2005), 116-38; Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights & the 
Legalization of Politics in Canada, rev. ed. (Toronto 1994). 
87  I do not mean to imply that unions cannot influence the outcome of constitutional 
litigation.  The long-term campaign of NUPGE and others to cast labour rights as human 
rights can certainly be viewed as a success in the aftermath of the BC Health Services 
case.  For example, see Derek Fudge, Collective Bargaining in Canada: Human Right or 
Canadian Illusion (Nepean, ON 2005).  The point rather is that the change in the form of 
politics and in the content of discourse moves the struggle onto a less favourable terrain 
for grassroots mobilization.  For a sharper critique of legal strategies, see Jonah Butovsky 
and Murray E.G. Smith, “Beyond Social Unionism: Farm Workers in Ontario and Some 
Lessons from Labour History,” Labour/Le Travail, 59 (Spring 2007), 69-97. 




that there was a rational connection between the means adopted and the 
objective being pursued, that there was minimal impairment of the right 
affected, and that there was proportionality between the objectives and the 
infringement.  The fact that the government negotiated in advance of the 
legislation would greatly strengthen its minimal impairment argument, and 
a court worried about labour militancy could easily find that the breach 
was demonstrably justified.88   
 
Finally, even where Charter challenges are successful, the remedy 
awarded by the courts provides workers with few tangible benefits.  In 
Dunmore, for example, the court found that the exclusion of Ontario 
agricultural workers from statutory collective bargaining laws violated 
their freedom of association.  However, it left it to the government to 
fashion a remedy, which it did relying on a parsimonious reading of the 
court’s decision.  The resulting legislation provided agricultural workers 
with protection against unfair labour practices but did not require 
employers to recognize and bargain with a union that was supported by a 
majority of their employees.  The result is that agricultural workers in 
Ontario remain unorganized and are back before the courts, having lost 
their first challenge to the government’s remedial legislation.nature of the 
remedy that is ordered.89  Similarly, in the Health Services case the court 
declared that some provisions of the government’s legislation violated the 
Charter, but it suspended its judgments for twelve months to allow the 
government “to address the repercussions of the decision.”90  What the BC 
government will do remains to be seen, but it is likely that it will emulate 
the approach of the Harris government’s response to Dunmore and do as 
little as possible.  Indeed, at least in Dunmore the court spelled out some 
minimum protections that had to be provided.  The court’s marching 
orders to the government in Health Services are even vaguer and, 
ironically given the holding in the case, do not even require the 
government to engage in good faith consultations with the successful 
                                                 
88 The SCC seemed to be particularly disturbed by the failure of the B.C. government to 
consult with the unions in advance of the legislation.  For example, see paras. 156-61. 
89  Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016; Agricultural 
Employees Protection Act, S.O. 2002, c. 16; Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General) (2006), 
79 O.R. (3d) 219 (upholding the government’s legislative response).   
90 Paragraph 168. 
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plaintiffs in devising an acceptable response to the mess created by its 
unconstitutional conduct, although there have been some consultations.91 
The second historical irony is that the judgment embraces an industrial 
pluralist faith that the process of collective bargaining will advance the 
goals of workplace democracy and economic equality at a time when the 
limitations of the Wagner Act model have become increasingly apparent, 
even to some industrial pluralists.92  Here we can see how the failure of the 
court to read or understand the critique of industrial pluralism in the 
scholarship it cited contributed to a flawed judgment, even when assessed 
from the perspective of what the court said it was hoping to achieve.  It 
allows the court to rely upon an idealized view of a model that is less 
suited than ever to achieve its stated objectives.  Perhaps this decision is a 
classic example of the cliché that those who do not learn the lessons of 
history are condemned to repeat its mistakes.   
 
Let us first turn to the value of democracy.  Recall that in its presentation 
of Canadian labour law history the court states that by “adopting the 
Wagner Act model Canadian government recognized the fundamental 
need for workers to participate in the regulation of their work 
environment.”  As well, the court identified the enhancement of 
democracy as a Charter value that supported the recognition of a 
constitutional right to collective bargaining.  There is much that could be 
said about the limited form of workplace democracy that was ever 
contemplated by the Wagner Act model,93 or that is likely contemplated by 
the SCC, but that is not the focus here.  Rather, the point is that even on its 
own terms, the application of the Wagner Act model resulted in a 
                                                 
91  HEU, “Health unions hold first meeting with government on Bill 29 court ruling,” (6 
September 2007) 
<http://www.heu.org/News/2007/09/NewsRelease6426/index.cfm?call2=2BD5D75C&ty
pe=1> (18 December 2007). 
92 John O’Grady, “Beyond the Wagner Act, What Then?,” in Daniel Drache, ed., Getting 
on Track (Montreal 1992), 153-69; H.W. Arthurs, The New Economy and the Demise of 
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without its modern-day defenders.  For example, see Laurel Sefton MacDowell, 
Renegade Lawyer (Toronto 2001), 293-98. 
93 The complicated relationship between the Wagner Act and industrial democracy is a 
large subject.  For a recent overview and analysis, see Étienne Cantin, “The Poverty of 
Industrial Democracy,” PhD Dissertation, York University, 2007. 




substantial and growing democratic deficit, which the SCC’s 
constitutionalization of collective bargaining rights is unlikely to affect.    
 
Most fundamentally, the model naturalizes a starting point in which 
workers have no legal right to bargain collectively unless the majority of 
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit, determined by a labour 
relations board, choose union representation.  In other words, workers 
begin from a legal position in which their need for a voice is not realized 
and no workplace democracy exists – or at least none is required.  Surely, 
it might be argued, if collective bargaining is the means for meeting the 
fundamental worker need for, and Charter value of, democratic voice, 
then the regime’s starting point is the reverse of what it should be.  Just as 
there is no need for citizens to opt into democratic public governance, 
workers should not have to opt into the collective bargaining regime to 
gain access to workplace democracy.  Rather, some form of workplace 
democracy should be constitutionally required, whether it be through 
mandatory works councils, as we already have in most Canadian 
jurisdictions for occupational health and safety, or compulsory collective 
representation, as exists in the Quebec construction industry.94 
 
Moreover, the application of the Wagner Act opt-in model never brought 
industrial democracy to the majority of Canadian workers and is 
increasingly ill-suited for doing so given the changing realities of the 
Canadian labour market.  The scheme was initially designed to operate 
under labour market conditions that prevailed in the dominant sectors of 
the post-World War II economy: large workplaces with permanent, full-
time, and predominantly male employees.  The regime never worked well 
in secondary labour markets, which tended to be dominated by small, 
intensely competitive employers.  Not only was it resource intensive for 
unions to organize small bargaining units populated by insecure workers, 
who were disproportionately female, visible minority and/or new 
immigrant, but employer resistance to unionization tended to be 
                                                 
94 Generally, Roy J. Adams, Labour Left Out (Ottawa 2006). On worker participation in 
occupational health and safety regulation, see Eric Tucker, “Re-Mapping Worker 
Citizenship in Contemporary Occupational Health and Safety Regimes,” International 
Journal of Health Services 37:1 (2007), 145-70.  For a description of the Quebec scheme 
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34                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 04 NO. 01 
 
particularly stiff.  As a result, union density in this sector remained low.95  
More recently, the successful pursuit of neo-liberal strategies and labour 
market restructuring has led to a decline in the share of employment in the 
formerly dominant and unionized core of the economy, with a 
corresponding growth in the share of employment in historically non-
unionized sectors of the economy where more precarious forms of 
employment tend to dominate.  As a result, the Wagner Act model of 
opting into the collective bargaining regime bargaining unit by bargaining 
unit is less effective and there has been a steady decline in private sector 
trade union density that shows no sign of leveling off, notwithstanding 
recent efforts by trade unions to shift resources into organizing and to 
develop innovative organizing strategies.96 
  
Of course, this case was about government interference with the collective 
bargaining rights of unionized workers, not the problems non-unionized 
workers who are either excluded by law from Wagner Act collective 
bargaining schemes or by the model’s inefficacy in the present Canadian 
labour market.  But the court’s judgment touched on these issues in a 
manner that is unlikely to be helpful to workers who wish to challenge de 
jure or de facto exclusions.  As noted earlier, the court was careful to 
specify that the right it was recognizing was a limited one.  Specifically, it 
stated “the right is to a general process of collective bargaining, not to a 
particular model of labour relations, nor to a specific bargaining 
method.”97  While this does not preclude challenges to de jure exclusions 
from statutory schemes, such as the one successfully mounted by 
Ontario’s agricultural workers in the Dunmore case, it also does not make 
it easier for those claims to succeed.  Excluded workers will still have to 
                                                 
95 Daniel Drache and Harry Glasbeek, The Changing Workplace (Toronto 1992); Judy 
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show that absent a protective legislative framework they are unable 
effectively to pursue association activities such as union formation and 
collective bargaining.98  At best, this will require the government to 
prohibit employer interference with organizing activity and require 
employers to bargain in good faith with groups of organized workers.99  
This is likely to benefit only a tiny fraction of unorganized private sector 
workers.  Workers who are excluded because the scheme is poorly 
matched to emerging labour market realities will not benefit at all.  In 
short, because the judgment adopts such an unrealistic view of the 
contribution made by the Wagner Act model to the achievement of 
workplace democracy in Canada, the court is blinded to the irony of its 
protection of that model in the name of democracy.100 
 
What about the advancement of the Charter value of equality?  In its brief 
discussion of that value and its relation to collective bargaining, the court 
makes it clear that it is concerned with substantive economic inequality.  
Moreover, it quoted Dickson J.’s dissenting judgment in the Alberta 
Reference case, which while not naming capitalism, recognized that it 
produces inherent class inequality.  “Historically, workers have combined 
to overcome the inherent inequalities of bargaining power in the 
employment relationship and to protect themselves from unfair, unsafe, or 
exploitative working conditions.”101   
 
How well does the court’s judgment actually achieve this goal?  The 
answer is not very well at all.  Here too the court begins from a highly 
idealized view of the Wagner Act-model, ignoring the critical judgments 
                                                 
98 Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016. 
99 The courts decision in Dunmore stopped short of imposing a duty to bargain in good 
faith and the Ontario government’s parsimonious response did not require it either. Based 
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to provide vulnerable workers with access to a collective bargaining process that imposes 
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100 For a somewhat more optimistic assessment, see Roy J. Adams, “Is Collective 
Bargaining Now Really Free?,” CCPA Monitor (September 2007), 
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contained in the literature it referenced.  As a result, it neither addresses 
the limited ambition of the Wagner Act model, nor its increasing 
ineffectiveness.  With regard to the former, as discussed earlier, both Klare 
and Fudge and Glasbeek argued that it was never intended that the Wagner 
Act model would shift the balance of power in a manner that would 
seriously challenge “the inherent inequalities of bargaining power in the 
employment relationship,”102 which are the product of the underlying 
structure of capitalist relations of production.   
 
But even if we hold the scheme to a lower standard of equality, one that 
was clearly contemplated by the model and presumably is embraced by the 
Supreme Court - the amelioration of the inherent inequality in the 
employment relation – its success historically was limited and is currently 
in decline.  There are a number of reasons for this, one of which is the 
highly fragmented bargaining structure contemplated by the model, based 
on a group of employees of a particular employer at a particular location.  
As a result, historically the scheme principally benefited predominantly 
male workers in dominant sectors of the economy, both because they were 
able to extensively organize their industries and because competitive 
pressure on wages could be reduced through collective action.  These 
conditions did not prevail elsewhere and so the gains in bargaining 
leverage were lower, leading to poorer outcomes, even when workers were 
unionized.  The failure of the scheme to boost bargaining leverage more 
generally left large numbers of workers, many of whom were women, new 
immigrants and/or visible minorities, dependent on minimum standards 
laws, which established floors that were significantly below the conditions 
that prevailed in the dominant unionized sectors of the economy.103 
 
Even these limited gains, however, have become increasingly difficult to 
retain.  In part this is a function of declining union densities, mentioned 
earlier, but it is also a result of the effects of neo-liberal policies that have 
                                                 
102 Dickson, id. 
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exposed dominant sectors such as auto and steel to increased international 
competition, so that the potential gains from collective action – even if 
coordinated on a national level – are smaller.104  Even strong unions like 
the Canadian Auto Workers, which split from its American parent in the 
1980s in part over contract concessions and which still rejects them in 
principle, are now making them in an effort to staunch the bleeding of 
jobs.105  The recent deal with Magna in which the CAW concedes the right 
to strike and the right of workers to select their own representatives is the 
clearest evidence of this trend.106  The weakening of bargaining leverage 
has contributed to the decline in labour’s share of income and the 
corresponding growth in profit’s share since the late 1970s.107  In sum, the 
SCC’s exaltation of the benefits that the Wagner Act model of collective 
bargaining has brought in advancing the goal of economic equality simply 
does not ring true in 2007.  
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Moreover, while the SCC cannot be expected to erect a constitutional 
shield that will protect workers against the structural forces of capitalism, 
its failure to consider the critical accounts of the historical development of 
the Wagner Act model in Canada and its current weakness, enables it to 
treat the collective bargaining process as the only form of self-directed 
worker activity that needs to be protected, while ignoring the salience of 
unequal power relations on its effectiveness as a means for realizing 
associational objectives.  As the court makes clear the constitutional right 
is to a process and does not guarantee a substantive or economic outcome.  
Moreover, it does not guarantee access to a particular model of labour 
relations or bargaining method.108  Nor for that matter does it guarantee 
that workers’ freedom of association will protect their freedom to engage 
in collective action in support of their bargaining demands.   Essentially, 
what is protected is access to some kind of process of good faith 
bargaining and the question for the court is whether a government’s action 
has or is likely to significantly and adversely impair that process.109    To 
determine whether this right has been violated the court will inquire into 
the importance of the subject matter that has been interfered with and 
whether the government has respected the duty to consult and bargain in 
good faith.110   
 
What this means in practice is absent exigent circumstances that would 
justify a violation of the collective bargaining process, governments 
cannot unilaterally refuse to bargain in good faith, take important matters 
off the bargaining table, or nullify significant terms in existing collective 
agreements.111  For public sector workers who have been subject to these 
practices, this is meaningful, if limited protection.  The limit inheres in the 
superior bargaining power that employers, including public sector 
employers, enjoy, and which is not fundamentally reduced by the duty to 
bargain in good faith, a fact amply demonstrated in the private sector 
where employers have been able to wring concessions from unionized 
workers, sometimes even during the life of the collective agreement, 
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notwithstanding that they are under a legal duty to bargain in good faith 




The SCC’s recognition of the right to collective bargaining as a protected 
aspect of freedom of association is a welcome one that will provide 
unionized public sector workers with a modicum of protection against 
government assaults on trade union rights.  More generally, it also elevates 
the status of the right to collective bargaining from being a political right 
to being a fundamental right.  The decision, however, is replete with 
ironies.   On its own the court’s ironic use of critical labour scholarship to 
construct an industrial pluralist narrative of Canadian labour history may 
not be of much interest to anyone apart from labour historians.  However, 
the court’s failure to learn the lessons of that critical literature enables it 
not only to position itself as the protector of collective bargaining rights, 
but also to present an idealized view of the contribution made by the 
collective bargaining process to the advancement of workplace democracy 
and economic equality at a time when its ability to deliver these goals is in 
steep decline.  In short the decision delivers too little too late.  The 
promise of industrial pluralism, even when constitutionalized, rings 
increasingly hollow.  The labour movement and the Left, therefore, still 
face the same challenge they faced before this decision: how to rebuild a 
movement capable of achieving genuine workplace democracy and 
substantive economic equality through workplace and political action.   
 
 
